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Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are an important part of the toolbox of policy makers to combat global environmental problems, as suggested by the pure number of existing treaties. 1 As there is no supranational authority that can enforce transnational treaties, IEAs hinge on the voluntary participation of member countries. In the context of climate change, however, the difficulties in agreeing on a uniform policy for the post Kyoto era become more and more evident, as the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009 proofed markedly. The passed consensus of the meeting, the so called Copenhagen Accord, failed to meet the expectations of experts, politicians and the broad public alike: neither does it include specific greenhouse gas emission (reduction) targets for the period after 2012 nor is it supported by a majority of the world's sovereign nations.
In order to increase the probability of successful international cooperation in the future, it would be serviceable to better understand the determinants of existing IEAs to enter into force. As the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is so far the only existing international treaty including specific targets for greenhouse gas emissions for at least some developed countries, we empirically analyze its enacting process within a political economy framework. The key novelty in this paper is that we assume that each country's net benefits of ratification depend on a broad selection of economic and political factors and, in particular, on whether the treaty eventually enters into force. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent ratification benefits and test it via a generalized ordered response model. In combination with specific rules of the KP, our theoretical model predicts strategic behavior of potential member countries, which we verify empirically. We also analyze the signature stage of the KP by means of a generalized binary response model, as our theoretical model implies that ratification is not necessarily a stronger signal for support than signature.
The existing literature analyzing IEAs in general and the KP in particular focused on the decision of countries whether or when to ratify an agreement. Often, the KP is part of a data set comprising several IEAs in order to study ratification within binary choice or duration models. 2 Other treaties, these papers examined, include the Helsinki Protocol , the Vienna and/or Montreal Protocol (Congleton 1992 , Beron et al. 2003 , or the Framework Convention on Climate Change (von Stein 2008) . With respect to the KP, Fredriksson et al. (2007) analyze countries' determinants for ratification by 2002.
They use a hazard rate model to analyze whether corruption facilitates environmental lobbying. In a similar approach, von Stein (2008) analyzes the effect of different political factors on the ratification of the KP. Neumayer (2002a,b) are -to the best of our knowledge -the 1 only papers also analyzing the signing stage of the KP, in which the author focused on two specific questions: whether more democratic countries exhibit a higher probability of signing and whether trade openness facilitates signing.
In the present paper, we contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we study strategic behavior with respect to ratifying the KP. In this respect our paper shares some similarities with Beron et al. (2003) who find no evidence for strategic behavior in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol using trade relationships. Concentrating on state dependent net benefits of ratification, our theoretical model allows us to distinguish four different categories of countries: (i) countries unconditionally supporting the KP, (ii) countries which prefer the KP to enter into force but are even better off if this is achieved without ratifying themselves, (iii) countries which prefer the KP not to enter into force, but given it does, are better off to ratify and (iv) countries that are unconditionally harmed by the KP.
A country's category has implications for the timing of ratification. Countries of category (i) have no incentive to postpone ratification and should thus do so right away. Category (ii) countries should postpone ratification, as they are better off if the KP enters into force without them ratifying. However, as they prefer the KP to enter into force, they should ratify if its enacting is endangered by their reluctance to ratify. Countries of category (iii) will only ratify when the KP already entered into force or it is apparent that it will do so, and countries of category (iv) never ratify. We show that, due to the specific design of the KP, the ratification period splits into three subperiods. In the first period only category (i) countries are expected to ratify. In the second period which starts by Russia's announcement to ratify the KP and, after the withdrawal of the U.S., can be interpreted as a coordination of the remaining Annex I countries to bring the KP into force, category (ii) countries ratified. Russia's actual ratification of the KP, which also triggered the KP to enter into force marks the beginning of the third period, in which category (iii) countries are expected to ratify. Second, with hindsight, it turned out that whether to ratify was not a crucial issue in case of the KP. So far, 191 countries ratified the KP, with the US being the only prominent exception, but only 84 countries signed it during the signature period between 1998 and 1999. While the KP was open for signature for only one year, the ratification stage comprised almost 10 years. Thus, signing and ratification may have different meanings. Moreover, our theoretical model suggests that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal for support than signature. 3 In particular, this holds for category (iii) countries, which should never sign the treaty but are expected to ratify it when it is clear that it will enter into force.
We, therefore, consider the signing stage as being under-researched so far with Congleton (1992) and Neumayer (2002a,b) as the only exceptions we are aware of.
Third, for explaining signing and ratification, we do not ex ante focus on specific aspects like interest groups (Fredriksson et al. 2007) , democracy (Congleton 1992 , Neumayer 2002a , Midlarsky 1998 , trade (Neumayer 2002b) , or political entanglement (Bernauer et al. 2008 ).
Instead, we apply a comprehensive economic analysis using a broad set of variables including measures for damage costs of climate change, measures for energy usage, amount of emissions, and political factors that may influence or are already known to influence international cooperation.
Our empirical analysis of the KP supports our theoretical model of strategic behavior based on state dependent net benefits of ratification: we find evidence that (i) the split of the ratification period into the three subperiods is appropriate, and (ii) the net benefits of ratification are lower the later is the subperiod of ratification. We also show that a wide range of determinants influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify. However, we identify different determinants for signing and ratification. While signature is mainly driven by damage and compliance cost measures, political factors are important for the timing of ratification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the KP. In Section 3 we develop our theoretical model for the two stages under consideration. We elaborate on the data used, the econometric strategy and the estimation results in Section 4 and discuss our findings in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Kyoto Protocol in a Nutshell
In the Kyoto Protocol (KP), initially adopted on 11 December 1997, 39 industrialized countries and the European Community, so called Annex B countries, 4 commit to reduce the emissions of four greenhouse gases by 5.2% on average over the period between 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels. It was open for signature between 16 March 1998 and 15 March 1999 . Over this period the KP received 84 signatures. Of the 39 countries with reduction commitments, only 3 countries Belarus, Hungary and Iceland did not sign the protocol (Belarus just joined the list of countries with reduction commitments in November 2006). In addition to signature, countries had to ratify the protocol in order to accede to it. Countries which did not sign the protocol during the signature period were able to join it by ratification at any time later on. For entering into force the KP had to satisfy two conditions: It 4 In fact, the list of Annex B countries detailed in the KP with limitations on greenhouse gas emissions is identical to the list of Annex I countries specified in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) except for Turkey which is an Annex I but not an Annex B country. In the following, we abstract from this subtle difference and will exclusively use the term Annex I. had to be ratified by (i) at least 55 countries, which (ii) represented at least 55% of 1990 global greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I countries. Moreover, with respect to the ratification process timing may be important. We argue however, that it is not only total elapsed calendar time that matters (Fredriksson et al. 2007 ), but also whether ratification took place before or after certain key events. Figure   1 shows a histogram of the ratification process. We identify two key events (marked by vertical lines), Russia's announcement of supporting the KP in the concluding statement of the EU-Russia summit on 29 May 2002 and its actual ratification in November 2004, which triggered increased ratification activity (see kernel density estimates). 8 This indicates that a considerable number of countries ratified either after Russia's announcement of support 5 For a detailed discussion of Russia's ratification process see, for example, Buchner and Dall'Olio (2005) . 6 San Marino and Somalia, which ratified in 2010, are not included in our data sample. 7 While some studies estimated determinants for ratification up to some threshold date in a probit model (Neumayer 2002a,b) , other studies explicitly analyze the duration of the ratification process with a hazard model (Fredriksson et al. 2007 ). or after it was clear that the KP will enter into force. As we shall argue in the next section, this observation is consistent with the hypothesis that countries ratify at different times depending on their net benefits from the KP entering into force.
As a consequence, we analyze both the signature and ratification process. In fact, we seek 
Theory
We assume that all countries asses the expected benefits and costs associated with joining the Kyoto Protocol (KP). We assume further that countries make rational choices in their decision whether to sign, and whether and when to ratify the KP, that is countries sign/ratify if the net benefit of signing/ratification is positive.
State dependent benefits of ratification
The key novelty in our approach is that we assume that expected benefits of the KP depend not only on countries' ratification decisions but also on whether it will eventually enter into force. Thus, we distinguish two states of the world S = K if the KP is enacted and S =K if not. Of course, whether the KP will enter into force also depends on country i's decision to ratify (y i = 1) or not (y i = 0). We denote the expected benefits of country i by B i (y i , S), which depend on the country's ratification decision y i and the state of the world S.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ratification has no effect on the expected benefits of all countries i if the KP is not entering into force
This allows us to characterize countries according to the signs of the following two differences:
∆B 1 i > 0 indicates that country i is better off by ratifying the KP if it enters into force compared to the case that the KP will not be enacted at all. If ∆B 2 i > 0 country i is better off by ratifying the KP, given the KP enters into force.
As there are no legally binding commitments associated with signature, it has often been considered as cheap talk. Nevertheless, countries may fear a loss of international credibility if they sign the KP but fail to ratify it afterwards. This is supported by the fact that signing but not ratifying the KP was only observed for one country, the U.S. Therefore, we assume that only countries sign the KP, which are (at least at the time of signing) also sure to ratify it. Moreover, strategic considerations should play a minor role during the signature stage, as at that time countries did not know whether the KP will ever enter into force and signing did not have any legal consequences. Moreover, this event is independent of their 6 ratification decision. As a consequence, we expect only countries with ∆B 1 i > 0 to sign the KP.
Due to the two hurdles, it depends on how many and which countries ratify whether the KP enters into force. Countries for which ∆B 1 i > 0 and ∆B 2 i > 0 hold simultaneously lend unconditional support to the KP and have no incentive to postpone ratification. We expect these countries to ratify in the first phase. For example, this may include non-Annex I countries with high potential damages from climate change like small island states.
Countries for which ∆B 1 i > 0 but ∆B 2 i ≤ 0 would like the KP to enter into force, but also have an incentive to postpone ratification, as they are not worse (and probably better) off if enaction is achieved without themselves ratifying. In particular Annex I countries fall into this category, as they have an incentive to free-ride on the abatement efforts of other Annex I countries. We expect these countries to ratify in the second phase. The intuition is that after the withdrawal of the U.S. the possibilities for free-riding decreased drastically.
In addition, it was clear that the KP would not be enacted unless Russia ratified. Thus, Russia's announcement of support in the concluding statement of the EU-Russia summit on 29 May 2002 can be interpreted as the consensus of the remaining Annex I countries to bring the KP into force. In fact, we see that most Annex I countries ratified shortly after Russia announced its support.
Countries for which ∆B 1 i ≤ 0 and ∆B 2 i > 0 prefer the KP not to enter into force at all (or are indifferent), but given the KP is enacted, they are better off ratifying. As a consequence, we expect these countries to ratify in the third phase after the KP entered into force. As an example consider oil exporting non-Annex I countries. They prefer not to have any agreement constraining global greenhouse gas emissions. But, given the KP is enacted, they are better off ratifying in order to reap potential benefits of the KP such as technology transfers via the clean development mechanism. In fact, all OPEC countries did not sign the KP during the signature period 9 and ratified it after entering into force.
Finally, there may be countries for which ∆B 1 i ≤ 0 and ∆B 2 i ≤ 0. As these countries would never benefit from ratification no matter whether the KP is entering into force, we expect these countries not to ratify at all. Table 1 summarizes the predictions of our theory with respect to the timing of ratification.
According to our theory of state dependent benefits, ratification is not necessarily a stronger signal of support than signature. Signatories are expected to ratify the KP in the first or second phase. Contrariwise, countries which ratified in the third phase should not have signed the KP in the first place. Moreover, Annex I countries with emission reductions 9 Except Indonesia which left OPEC later on. 
phase 2 never targets are expected to ratify in the second phase. Table 2 shows that these predictions are well supported by our data. In addition, our theory suggests an ordinal ordering of the three ratification phases. With declining "degree of support" for the KP, which is accompanied by declining expected net benefits from ratifying the KP, countries should exhibit lower probability of signing the KP and should ratify later, if at all. Countries benefiting unconditionally from the KP should ratify in the first phase, countries benefiting from the KP but with incentives to free-ride on other countries abatement efforts are expected to ratify in the second phase and countries for which ratification is only beneficial if they cannot prevent the KP coming into force sign in the third phase.
Observable variables
We do not directly observe the expected net benefits of a country but only whether it signs and when it ratifies the KP. The hypothesis is that the expected net benefits are a function of a vector of observable influences, which we group into four categories: damage costs of climate change (DC), energy and emissions (EE), economic factors (EF) and political factors (PF).
Damage costs of climate change
An important part of the expected benefits are the mitigated damages from climate change which stem from a successful reduction and stabilization of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Although it is clear that the KP in itself cannot achieve this goal, it is an important cornerstone towards it: In contrast to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the KP is the first international agreement in which (at least some) countries commit to a greenhouse gas emissions target. In case of success, the KP could lead the way to more ambitious reduction targets for greater parts of the world. Thus, countries should be more likely to exhibit positive expected net benefits from the KP entering into force, the higher are their expected damage costs from climate change.
Calculation of damage costs of climate change is a difficult task, due to a variety of uncertainties. First, damage costs crucially hinge on future global greenhouse gas emissions that would occur if no international agreement towards a stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations can be achieved. These so called business-as-usual scenarios strongly depend on the future economic development, and thus vary substantially for different development scenarios (IPCC 2000) . Second, there is still substantial uncertainty how atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations translate into temperature rise. In fact, the best current estimate for the rise of the global mean temperature in thermodynamic equilibrium for a doubling of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations compared to pre-industrial levels ranges from 1. As measures for energy consumption and production we incorporate GDP per unit of energy use (GDPE) and the share of electricity production by natural gas, coal and oil (ELPR).
Emissions are captured by CO 2 intensity (COIN) and CO 2 emissions per capita (COPC). In order to capture general economic patterns, we include GDP per capita (GDPC) and annual GDP growth (GDPG) 12 in our empirical analysis (Neumayer 2002a ,b, Fredriksson et al. 2007 ).
Political Factors
Apart from damage and mitigation costs of climate change, there are other factors influencing the expected net benefits of acceding to the KP. First, Neumayer (2002a) finds that, everything else equal, democracies are more likely to ratify the KP (and three other IEAs) than non-democracies. Congleton (1992) argues that authoritarian rulers have a shorter time horizon (due to higher fear of being thrown out of office) and appropriate higher shares of the economy's income than the median voter in a democracy. The first effect leads to less strict environmental regulations, at least for environmental problems of a long-term nature such as climate change. The second effect on environmental regulation is ambiguous. A larger income share may lead to less strict environmental regulations if these regulations result in lower national income. But, a higher income may lead to a higher demand for of threatening sea level rise proofed that markedly. 11 In fact, we already observe discussions between the US and China on the role of emerging economies in the reduction efforts of greenhouse gases. 12 We took the 5 year average between 1994 and 1998 in order to eliminate business cycles effects. environmental quality if environmental quality is a normal or luxury good. As an indicator for the level of democracy we employ the Freedom House Index on Political Rights (POLI).
The hypothesis is that higher levels of political rights correlate with higher expected net benefits of IEAs. The index ranges from 1 to 7 with 1 being highest political rights. As a consequence, expected net benefits should decrease with the level of the Freedom House Index.
Second, all countries are sovereign in their decisions whether to accede to the KP, as there exists no supranational authority which can enforce accession. Nevertheless, there exists a network of international linkages between countries. These linkages may be economical, such as trade relationships, or political, for example, through international agencies or military power. Independent of their nature, these linkages may lead to contingent behavior among countries. More precisely, countries may experience benefits or avoid disadvantages if they behave with respect to the KP as other countries do to which they are strongly interconnected. Beron et al. (2003) We use WTO membership (WTO) and trade in percentage of GDP (TRAD) as indicators for economic entanglement, and the National Material Capabilities Indicator (CINC) of the Correlates of War Project as a proxy for "power", defined as the capacity of a state both to exercise and to resist influence (Singer et al. 1972 , Singer 1988 ).
Finally, we conjecture that countries that signed the KP expressed a strong commitment to the KP and underpinned this commitment by early ratification. As a consequence, we also test for signature (SIGN) in the ratification stage.
Empirics
After introducing the data, we outline the empirical strategy used to analyze the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, we report the results of the econometric analysis.
Data
Data for our empirical analysis stem from different sources. Table 3 shows Using a cross-country data set of the present form always implies some challenges with respect to the empirical strategy. In particular, there are three issues we would like to mention. First, every variable used in an econometric model may be available for a different set of countries leading to different sample sizes when using different specifications. Second, variables on country level may be highly correlated and, thus, cause a collinearity problem in the empirical analysis. Third, there is a potential for an unobserved heterogeneity bias.
We address the first issue by comparing results for different sample sizes and different sets of covariates. To avoid collinearity, we only choose variables that show a moderate level of correlation. 19 However, it is not possible to construct a panel structure in order to correct for unobserved heterogeneity, as both decisions (signature and ratification) are only taken once.
Countries' benefits of the KP: a latent variable approach
Our assumption of rational choice implies that each country chooses, conditional on its characteristics, the combination of signing the KP, or not, and ratifying it in a certain period, which maximizes its expected net benefits. We identified two key events which split the ratification period into three subperiods: if a country ever ratifies the KP, it may do so prior to the announcement of Russia's ratification, after the announcement but before Russia's actual ratification, or after Russia ratified the KP. 13 Exceptions are: GDPG (1994 GDPG ( -1998 , CPOP (1995) , CCI (based on 1961-1990 data) and PREC (Average annual precipitation in mm per m 2 between 1961 and 1990). 14 http://unfccc.int 15 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 16 http://geodata.grid.unep.ch/ 17 http://www.freedomhouse.org 18 The US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and Russia is the pivotal player determining the thresholds for the ratification subperiods. 19 In the present sample, the highest correlation is at -.701 for GDPC and VAAG. a The reason for the max being larger than one is that overall population stems from a different source.
Then, a country is supposed to sign the KP if the underlying latent variable y ⋆ s (its net benefit of signing) is positive. Although we do not observe y ⋆ s , we observe whether a country signed or not (i.e., whether y s =1 or 0). We, therefore, hypothesize:
The underlying structural model can then be written as:
where y si denotes the signing decision of country i, X consists of measures for damage costs of climate change (DC), economic factors (EF), energy and emission related factors (EE) and political variables (PF). Furthermore, α, β, and ǫ are the parameter(s) (vectors) to be estimated and the disturbance term.
Building on our theoretical considerations in Section 3, we assume the net benefit of signing to be positive if ∆B 1 > 0, i.e. the country generally supports the KP.
Furthermore, a country's decision when to ratify the KP depends on the underlying latent variable y ⋆ r (its net benefit of ratifying), which in turn depends on whether the KP is entering into force. Again, we cannot observe y ⋆ r , but we observe in which period a country ratified the KP, i.e. y r = j with j = 1, 2, 3. According to our theory, the higher are a country's net benefits from ratification y ⋆ r , the earlier the period in which it ratifies: 
In addition,
where τ k (k = 0, . . . , 3) denote the threshold values for the latent variable at which a country changes the ratification period.
Then, the underlying structural model for the ratification stage can be written as:
where y ri and SIGN denote the timing of ratification and whether a country is among the signatories, respectively, and X again consists of DC, EF, EE, and PF. Furthermore, γ, θ, λ, and η are the parameter(s) (vectors) to be estimated and the disturbance term. Given the underlying latent variable approach, we use binary and ordered response models to analyze the signing and the ratification stage.
The signing decision
The decision whether to sign the KP is a binary choice. As a consequence, we use probit type estimators to analyze the determinants of signing (or not signing) the KP:
where again y si indicates whether a country signed the KP. As we will show in the following section, there is evidence that the homoscedasticity assumption of the standard probit model (σ 2 = 1) has to be relaxed such that the variance can vary as a function of explanatory variables. The resulting heteroscedastic probit model can then be written as:
where Z i denotes a vector of variables included in the variance equation and µ the associated parameter vector (Harvey 1976 ). 14
Model selection
In order to elicit the optimal empirical strategy in terms of model fit and predictive power, we estimated two different models using different sets of explanatory variables. We contrast the standard probit (PROB) model with the heteroscedastic probit (HETPROB), which is a generalization of the former. The reason for including a heteroscedastic model is that the variance turns out to be a function of GDP per capita (GDPC). 20 In Table 4 we further distinguish the estimated models: (i) the full set of explanatory variables implying 111 observations, (ii) a reduced set of explanatory variables after applying the stepwise procedure 21 implying also 111 observations, and (iii) a set of explanatory variables maximizing the number of observations (165 countries).
The lower part of Table 4 shows various measures of model fit for the six different specifications under consideration. Comparing both information criteria (BIC and AIC) and the percentage of correctly predicted outcomes (PCP), the standard probit and the heteroscedastic probit model with reduced sets of explanatory variables, as displayed in columns 3 and 4, are the preferred estimators. 22
Estimation results
Marginal Effects for the determinants of signing the KP are shown in the upper part of Table   4 . Although effects are robust across estimation methods and different sets of explanatory variables, we focus on the estimation results of the preferred estimators in columns 3 and 4.
Although GDPC does not have a significant effect on signing itself in HETPROB, it turns out that the likelihood-ratio test of heteroscedasticity is significant with a p-value of 0.057. 
The ratification decision
In contrast to signing, all parties to the UNFCCC included in our data set, except for the USA, ratified the KP until the end of 2009. Thus, the question is not whether a country ratified but when. As already mentioned, we split the ratification period into three subperiods: (i) before Russia announced ratification, (ii) after Russia's announcement and its actual ratification (which triggered the KP to enter into force), and (iii) after Russia's ratification and the KP becoming effective. According to our theory outlined in Section 3, the underlying latent variable, net benefits from ratification, is decreasing the later the ratification takes place. We model the ratification stage as an ordered response assuming that:
where y ri indicates the period in which country i ratified and F indicates the cumulative distribution function of the error term η. θ and λ are parameter vectors and τ 1 to τ j−1 denote threshold parameters to be estimated assuming that τ 0 = −∞ and τ 3 = ∞.
As will be shown in the following section, the standard ordered response model is too restrictive in this setting. As a consequence, we apply different alternatives in order to decide on the best estimator. It turns out that a generalized ordered response model (Maddala 1986, Peterson and Harrell 1990) with the logistic cumulative density function as link function F that allows for (some of) the parameter estimates to differ between outcomes j, performs best in terms of model fit: 
Model selection
Two important questions have to be discussed at this stage. First, is the classification of the dependent variable y r supported by the data? In contrast to the signing stage, we do not model ratification as a binary decision. Instead, by splitting the ratification period into three subperiods, we use a more subtle measure that has to be validated by the data. More precisely, it may be that the key events we identified are not as important as we presume and, thus, our set of explanatory variables is not able to distinguish between outcomes (Anderson 1984) .
Second, is the ordering of our dependent variable that is implied by our underlying latent variable backed by the empirical model? On the one hand, if the outcome categories were different, but there was no ordering, unordered models were preferable, as they are less restrictive compared to ordered models. If, on the other hand, there were an underlying ordering, multinomial models were inefficient, as they do not utilize all available information.
To test the validity of the classification of the dependent variable, we use a Wald test (after estimating a multinomial logit) 23 to detect whether our different alternatives can be combined. Full, Stepwise and Max. Observation indicate the set of covariates and resulting sample size with the full set of explanatory variables, a reduced set after applying the stepwise procedure, 24 and a reduced set that implies the maximum number of observations, respectively. For all different specifications the results in Table 5 justify rejecting the Nullhypothesis that all parameter estimates for a given pair of alternatives are zero. The second question boils down to the estimator choice. Candidates are either one of the two polar types of standard multinomial and ordered models or a model type lying in between.
As we shall show, the generalized ordered logit (Maddala 1986 , Ierza 1985 , in particular the partial proportional odds model (Peterson and Harrell 1990) , serves best in terms of model fit. Table 6 shows the estimation results for our set-up using different estimation approaches.
In general, mutlinomial models are more flexible than standard ordered response models.
This comes, however, at the cost of a efficiency loss, as the number of estimated parameters increases drastically. However, estimating a standard ordered response model may be too restrictive for the following reasons. First, the parallel lines assumption may be violated implying there exists evidence against the restriction of identical estimates for all alternatives.
As a Brant test 25 applied after an ordered logit supports this hypothesis for several variables, stratified (Anderson 1984) , sequential or generalized ordered models (Maddala 1986) are advisable. Second, there may be heteroscedasticity in our model, which is supported by our previous findings on the signature stage. Thus, a generalization of the traditional ordered logit/probit (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) may be appropriate. Comparing both information criteria for the multinomial logit (MLOG) and the ordered logit (OLOG) estimates for all three specifications, there is no clear indication which to prefer. While BIC is in favor of the OLOG, the AIC values support the MLOG results.
The percentage of correctly predicted outcomes (PCP) lends further support for the MLOG model. However, both estimates are inferior to the GOLOG results in column 5. The stratified logit model (SLOG), as introduced by Anderson (1984) , relaxes the parallel regression assumption and is applicable in case of doubt for an ordering of the dependent variable.
Comparing all available measures of fit, however, the stratified logit model does not outperform most of the other model specifications, and in particular, not the preferred generalized ordered logit model in column 5.
Another attractive approach in our setting is the sequential logit model (SEQL), as proposed by Maddala (1986) . 27 The appealing feature of sequential models is their ability to explicitly account for the time dimension of the dependent variable. However, comparing AIC and BIC also SEQL is outperformed by the GOLOG. SEQL only outperforms GOLOG in terms of predictive power. However, the difference is always in a reasonable range in order to stick to GOLOG as the difference in AIC and BIC usually is rather substantial.
Finally, column 5 displays results for the preferred generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds model (GOLOG). In order to calculate and interpret marginal effect we therefore rely on these estimates as they are best in terms of information criteria and at the same time show a reasonable predictive power (PCP = 70%) for the preferred stepwise specification. Table 7 shows the estimation results for the ratification stage. We present estimates for the preferred estimator, the generalized ordered logit (GOLOG), with the full set of explanatory variables (N = 109), after applying the stepwise procedure (N = 112) and with the maximum number of observations (N = 163). Although information criteria and predictive power reject the latter two specifications (while holding the number of observations fixed), 26 Although possible in the generalized ordered response model, no observations have an outcome with a predicted probability that is less than 0 in our specification. In addition to the presented models, we also used a heteroscedastic ordered model as suggested by Williams (2009) . However, as the Log-likelihood function did not converge, the interpretation of marginal effects is not advisable. 27 We estimate the sequential model using the user written command seqlogit in Stata by Buis (2007) .
Estimation results
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we provide the results in order to compare marginal effects for all sample sizes and sets of covariates. In general, the results show only little differences and even less for the significant effects.
The results confirm our theoretical predictions stated in Section 2. Whether a country signed the KP has a significant positive effect on period 1 and a negative effect on period 3 (.16 and -.28). Countries with a higher VAAG did have a significantly higher probability of ratifying in period 1 (.07) and a significantly lower probability in period 3 (-.13) . ELPR also shows a clear pattern with a significant positive effect on periods 1 and a negative effect on period 3 (.001 and -.002).
As expected, political factors impact on the timing of ratification. Countries with higher levels of CINC are less likely to ratify in period 1 and more likely to ratify in 2 (-.09 and 0.09). In addition, everything else equal, the degree of political rights have a significant positive effect in period 1 (-.05) and a negative effect on the probability of ratification in period 3 (0.10), while being member of the WTO does not affect the timing of ratification. Trade openness (TRAD) and being a Annex I country has a significant negative impact in period 1 (-.14 and -.18) .
Comparing the signing and ratification stage, we observe that indicators for damage costs of climate change and measures for compliance costs seem to have lower predictive capabilities for the decision when to ratify the KP compared to the signing stage. As this may stem from the fact that we included signing (SIGN) as an explanatory variable for the ratification process, we re-estimate the GOLOG model omitting SIGN (Table 8) . Although we observe similar results, there are minor differences worth mentioning. Now, VAAG is insignificant in all periods, while COPC has a negative impact in the first (-0.09) and a positive impact in the third period (0.13). In addition, the Annex I dummy is significantly positive in the second period (0.25).
Discussion
Our analysis shows that damage cost and compliance cost measures are particularly important for the decision whether to sign the KP. Countries are more likely to sign, the higher is the share of arable land (ARLA), the lower is the value added of agricultural sector in percentage of GDP (VAAG), the higher is precipitation (PREC), the higher is the climate change index (CCI), the higher is the CO 2 intensity (COIN) and the lower is the share of electricity production from fossil fuel sources (ELPR). In addition, the power index (CINC) exert a significantly positive impact. Note: Same estimation as in Table 7 but without SIGN as an explanatory variable.
Indicators for damage costs of climate change and measures for compliance costs seem to have lower predictive capabilities for the decision when to ratify the KP. Only the value added of agricultural sector in percentage of GDP (VAAG) and the share of electricity production from fossil fuel sources (ELPR) have a significantly positive impact in the first subperiod and a significantly negative effect in the third. 28 However, political factors turn out to be significant (CINC, TRAD and POLI). Overall, it seems that poor and less influential countries (high share of agricultural sector on GDP, low CO 2 emissions per capita, low power index, low trade share, non-Annex I country) were significantly more likely to ratify in the first subperiod, developed and powerful countries (Annex I country, high power index) were more likely to ratify in the second and less democratic countries with high CO 2 emissions per capita ratified in the third subperiod.
Thus, our analysis qualifies the results of the existing empirical literature investigating the signing and ratification of the KP (see the literature overview in Section 1). While political factors play a significant role for when to ratify the KP, the signing decision is rather driven by damage and compliance costs. Therefore, we strongly argue for testing a wide range of potential influences in the analysis of international environmental agreements instead of focussing on specific factors.
Moreover, our empirical analysis strongly supports our theoretical considerations outlined in Section 3. First, the division of the ratification period into three subperiods according to the two key events of Russia's ratification announcement and its actual ratification (which, in turn, triggered the KP to enter into force), seems appropriate. As shown in Table 5 , the three subperiods are significantly different. Second, our search for the most appropriate estimator (see Table 6 ) gives strong support for the generalized ordered logit model implying that there exists an ordering of the underlying latent variable, the net benefits of ratification, with respect to the three subperiods. In line with our theoretical model, the net benefits of ratification decrease the later the subperiod of ratification. Third, as predicted by our theoretical considerations, countries which signed the KP are significantly more likely to ratify in the first subperiod and are significantly less likely to ratify in the third. Forth, our analysis shows that Annex I countries had a higher probability of signing but, at the same time, had a lower probability of ratifying in the first subperiod.
In summary, we find sound empirical evidence for strategic behavior with respect to ratifying the KP. On the one hand, ratification is not necessarily a stronger signal for support than signing. In particular, countries ratifying after the KP entered into force are suspected to do so because ratification is only beneficial if the KP cannot be prevented in the first place. As already argued, this is certainly true for OPEC members. On the other hand, Annex I countries, which have a strong incentive to free-ride on the emission reductions of other Annex I countries, were reluctant to ratify the KP right away. 29 The 55% emission hurdle in combination with U.S.' withdrawal from the KP reduced free-riding opportunities substantially which eventually led to a cooperation of the remaining Annex I countries in bringing the KP into power.
With hindsight it seems that the 55% emission hurdle helped to overcome Annex I countries' reluctance to ratify the KP. However, we are cautious to suggest that such hurdles are, in general, helpful to overcome free-riding incentives in the context of international environmental agreements. On the one hand, they may help to coordinate on cooperative actions, as in the case of the KP. On the other hand, the higher is the hurdle, the higher is the negotiation power of individual countries to exert side-payments and transfers for their cooperation, which may actually impede cooperation (see, for example, the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen).
Conclusions
We analyzed the decision of countries whether to sign and whether and when to ratify the KP by testing for a wide range of potential influences, covering not only political factors but also variables reflecting damage costs of climate change, energy and emissions patterns and general economic indicators. We find that damage and compliance cost measures have an significant impact on the decision whether to sign the KP. For the ratification stage, we developed a theory of strategic behavior, which explains countries' timing of ratification with respect to certain key events. We identified Russia's announcement to ratify and its actual ratification as the important key events, which triggered increased ratification activity. Our empirical results support our selection of key events and provides strong evidence for strategic behavior.
It seems that the particular set-up of the KP, namely the 55% hurdle of 1990 Annex I greenhouse emissions, in combination with the withdrawal of the U.S. played an important role to overcome the free-riding incentives from Annex I countries to benefit from other countries emission abatements without ratifying themselves. Although we are cautious to suggest that such hurdles facilitate establishing international environmental agreements, we consider further empirical investigation of similar rules in international agreements as a fruitful avenue for future research.
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